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Assertion: Just One Way to Take It Back 
 
Mona Simion1 
 
Abstract 
According to Jonathan Kvanvig, the practice of taking back one’s 
assertion when finding out that one has been mistaken or gettiered 
fails to speak in favour of a knowledge norm of assertion. To support 
this claim, he introduces a distinction between taking back the content 
of the assertion, and taking back the speech act itself. This paper 
argues that Kvanvig’s distinction does not successfully face close 
speech-act-theoretic scrutiny. Furthermore, I offer an alternative 
diagnosis of the target cases sourced in the normativity of action. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
One must: assert that p only if one knows that p. Or at least that’s what a very 
popular view on the epistemic normativity of assertion stipulates. This has become 
known in the literature as the Knowledge Norm of Assertion (KNA).2In spite its 
popularity, KNA is taken by some to be too strong a requirement. Jonathan Kvanvig 
(2009, 2011), for instance, defends a weaker, justified belief norm on assertion 
(henceforth, JNA), where the relevant epistemic standing is knowledge-level 
justification. It is argued that KNA, as opposed to JNA, has a hard time explaining 
cases in which assertions on some lesser epistemic standings do not render the 
speakers subject to criticism.Assertions on false belief that the speaker mistakes for 
knowledge and assertions on gettiered belief are cases in point.  
 Defenders of KNA have mostly employed one version or another of what has 
become known as the ‘excuse manoeuvre’. Williamson (2000, 2009), for instance, 
argues that speakers asserting on what they mistakenly take to be knowledge, 
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although in breach of the norm, have a good excuse for making an impermissible 
assertion. One way to see this is by noticing that, as soon as they discover they have 
been mistaken or gettiered, speakers will typically take back their assertions. 
 In defence of JNA, Kvanvig distinguishes between two ways of taking back an 
assertion: by taking back the speech act itself, in cases in which the speaker lacks 
proper justification for his assertion, or by only taking back the content of the speech 
act – in cases of false or gettiered justified beliefs. The norm of assertion, Kvanvig 
argues, is a norm governing a type of human activity. Therefore, only when the act 
itself is taken back should we consider the norm to have been broken.  
 This paper is a rejoinder on behalf of KNA. It is argued thatKvanvig’s distinction 
between two ways of taking back does not successfully face close speech-act-
theoretic scrutiny. To show this, I will first introduce the target cases (section 2); 
further on, I briefly outline Kvanvig’s ‘taking back’ argument and show why it fails 
(section 3). In section 4, I will offer a diagnosis of Kvanvig’s cases sourced in the 
normativity of action, which will turn out to be perfectly compatible with KNA. In 
the last section I conclude (5). 
 
 
2. Assertions from Belief that Falls Short of Knowledge 
 
Consider the following two cases: 
 
(i) Assertion on justified false belief: 
 
FAKE SNOW: […] it is winter, and it looks exactly as it would if there were 
snow outside, but in fact that white stuff is not snow but foam put there by a film 
crew of whose existence I have no idea. I do not know that there is snow outside, 
because there is no snow outside, but it is quite reasonable for me to believe not 
just that there is snow outside but that I know that there is; for me, it is to all 
appearances a banal case of perceptual knowledge. Surely it is then reasonable 
for me to assert that there is snow outside (Williamson 2000, 257). 
 
And  
 
(ii) Assertion on justified true belief that falls short of knowledge: 
 
FAKE BARNS: […] suppose that Wendy correctly sees the only real barn that, 
unbeknownst to her, is completely surrounded by barn facades and asserts to me 
“There was a barn in the field we just passed” on this basis (Lackey 2008, 544). 
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 In both the cases above, speakers assert from what they mistakenly take to be 
knowledge. And, intuitively, they can hardly be subject to blame. Also, notice that 
no further normative constraints seem to be active in these cases, so as to maybe 
override the epistemic requirement. 
 In defence of KNA, Williamson (2000, 256) argues that, in the cases above, 
although the speaker has a good excuse for having broken KNA, he is still in breach 
of the norm. According to him, it would seem natural for someone who had strong 
reasons to think what he asserted was true, to apologize when finding out it was 
actually false. Here is Williamson: 
 
Misrecognizing someone, I may say: ‘That’s Sasha—no, sorry, it’s not—it’s just 
someone who looks very like him.’ […] Nor is it strange for a newspaper to 
apologize to its readers for an error in a previous edition, nor for the author of a 
book to apologize in the preface for any remaining errors, even though every 
effort has been made to ensure that the contents are correct (Williamson 2009, 
345).  
 
 Equally, it would not seem very odd if Wendy, after you point out to her that 
she’s in Fake Barn County, were to say something along the lines of: “Sorry, I didn’t 
know that”. 
 
 
3. Two Ways of Taking Back 
 
Notice, however, that Williamson’s defence fails to establish that excuses, while not 
odd, are really necessary in these cases. However, one thing is clear: after finding out 
that he was mistaken or gettiered, one should not stand by the commitments implied 
by one’s assertion anymore. Thus, rather than presenting excuses as such, an 
appropriate reaction would go along the lines of “Oh, I take that back. I was not 
aware of there being a film crew producing fake snow outside”, or “Oh, I take that 
back, I had no idea we were in Fake Barn County”.  
 In support of JNA, however,Jonathan Kvanvig distinguishes two types of attitude 
a speaker has in response to his assertions being corrected. Kvanvig argues that “in 
some cases of correction, we take back the content of our speech act, and in other 
cases we apologize for, and regret, the very act itself”. For example, if we assert p 
and then are shown that p is false, we take back the content of our speech act, but we 
needn't apologize for or regret the very act itself. “In fact, were [we] to apologize, the 
natural response would be dismissive: Give it a rest, nobody's always right..."(2009, 
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8). According to Kvanvig, the same distinction plays out with gettiered assertions 
too. Thus, presumably, in the case of Wendy above, if after she asserts “There’s a 
barn in the field”, and I point out to her that she can’t possibly know that, as we are 
in Fake Barn County, she would just take back what she said, not to apologize for 
having said it.  
 Kvanvig argues that things are different when you don’t have justification for 
what you say, even if, by some bizarre twist, you turn out to be right. In support of 
this, he offers the case of Billy Bob, a Texas Democrat, who, based on a headline on 
a tabloid, asserts to his friend Sue: “George Bush is a communist!” When Sue points 
out to him that he should not trust tabloids, Billy Bob apologizes: “You're right, I 
shouldn't have believed that paper and I shouldn't have said what I did. I take it 
back". 
 According to Kvanvig, in this situation, apologizing and taking back the speech 
act itself is the right thing to do. He argues that norms of assertion are norms 
governing a certain type of human activity, and thus relate to the speech act itself 
rather than the content of such an act. As such, only when the speech act itself is at 
fault, do we have reason to think that some norm of assertion is broken; when only 
the content of the assertion needs to be taken back, the assertion itself is not at fault. 
 Here is, however, some reason to doubt that Kvanvig’s distinction works; speech 
act literature3distinguishes between the content of a speech act and the illocutionary 
force by which the content is being put forward. One can perform various speech 
acts upon p: one can ask whether p, promise that p, threaten that p etc. In the case of 
assertion, by uttering p the speaker presents p as true. 
 Given this, a proposition is itself communicatively inert; that is to say that to 
actually perform a speech act, one has to put forth a proposition with an illocutionary 
force, such as assertion, promise, command, etc.  
 But if the propositional content is inert in isolation, it is less clear how Kvanvig 
envisages one being able to take it back in isolation. To see this, notice that assertion, 
as opposed to other types of actions – say, having vacationed in Hawaii – can be 
‘taken back’. Not in the sense that one can change the past as to not have had 
asserted in the first place, of course. Rather, taking back an assertion that p refers to 
no longer standing behind the commitments implied by having asserted that p. Now, 
p itself, in isolation, does not imply any commitments whatsoever. That is, 
depending on which illocutionary force we will act upon it with, different 
commitments will follow. If I promise that p, for instance, I commit myself to a 
future course of action; if I assert that p, I commit myself to, at least, it being the case 
that p. 
                                                
3See, e.g. Green (2014). 
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 If that is the case, it becomes clear that in order to take an assertion back, that is, 
to be released from the commitments implied by it, it has to be the case that I take 
back everything, force and content. I cannot only take back the content p, because p 
in isolation does not commit me to anything, inasmuch as I do not present it as true, 
or command p, or promise p, etc. Also, I cannot only take the action back either, 
because presenting nothing as true, or promising nothing also fails to imply any 
commitments on my part.  
 So the only way in which one can take an assertion back is by not standing behind 
the commitments implied by the whole compound: having presented p as true. 
 
 
4. Diagnosis 
 
Something seems, indeed, intuitively different between the two cases presented by 
Kvanvig, though. To see what it is, let us start by clearing the normative air a bit. 
 According to a fairly uncontroversial view in the normativity literature4 that has 
been with us since Aristotle, one is an apt candidate for blame for violating a norm 
only if the agent is aware of what it is she is doing or bringing about (NE, 1110a-
1111b4). As such, one may reasonably do something impermissible because one 
reasonably but falsely believes it to be permissible. If your car’s (well maintained) 
speedometer has unluckily just broken, you might break the norms of safe driving 
due to its misreadings, and still be blameless for doing so. For all you know, your act 
is proper according to the norm, even though, in fact, this is not the case. Similarly, if 
you fail to keep your promise to meet your friend Ted for lunch because your 
(otherwise highly reliable) secretary misinforms you about the time at which you’re 
supposed to meet him, you’re blameless for not showing up. However, your having 
broken your promise remains an improper act according to the norms of social 
commitment. 
 With regard to this though, some qualifications are needed. The literature (e.g 
Zimmerman (1997)) distinguishes between direct and indirect blameworthiness for 
performing an action. One is indirectly blameworthy for something x, if and only if 
one is blameworthy for it by way of being blameworthy for something else, y, of 
which x is the consequence.  
 One could be indirectly blameworthy for performing an action out of ignorance, 
by being directly blameworthy for being ignorant. Notice, though, that in both the 
above cases, although the agent ends up with a false belief that his actions are in 
                                                
4 See e.g. Haji (1998), Zimmerman (1997). People working in this field disagree whether a belief or a 
knowledge condition is appropriate for blameworthiness. Although not much in this paper hinges on 
this, I here go with the stronger view – supporting the belief condition - both because I find it more 
plausible, and in order to stay on the safe side by attributing blameworthiness more generously.  
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accordance with the relevant norms, this seems to happen through no fault of his 
own. That is, he seems to have conformed to his epistemic duties: coming to believe 
that you are driving at a certain speed via looking at your car’s well maintained 
speedometer is a quite reliable way to go about it, as is asking your secretary about 
your schedule for the day. Surely, if our agent were to be speeding due to his trusting 
his three years old son’s readings of the speedometer, we would tend to find him 
blameworthy for his breaking the traffic norms.5 Thus, let us formulate the principle 
governing the relationship between awareness of breach of the norm and 
blameworthiness as follows: 
 
Blame-Awareness: An agent is blameless for performing an all-things-considered 
improper act if she conformed to her epistemic duties and she had good reasons to 
believe she was respecting the norm. 
 
 Let us now, in the light of this, go back to the cases put forth by Kvanvig. First, 
by Blame-Awareness, the speakers in FAKE SNOW and FAKE BARNS, asserting 
on justified belief, are epistemically blameless, both directly and indirectly. They 
both assert from what they mistakenly take to be knowledge, and they seem to have 
conformed to their epistemic duties in forming the respective beliefs. After all, 
perception is a pretty reliable way to go about forming beliefs. In contrast, notice that 
Billy Bob’s belief formation process, as Sue rightly points out, does not stand very 
tall when it comes to reliability. So, indeed, Billy Bob is indirectly blameworthy, as 
he failed to conform to his epistemic duties before proceeding, which led to him 
being in breach of the norm. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
I have argued that Kvanvig’s distinction between two ways of taking back a speech 
act does not successfully face close speech-act theoretic scrutiny. In order to be 
released from the commitments implied by a speech act, one has to take back both 
content and illocutionary force; one without the other will not imply any 
commitments to begin with. Also, I have put forth a KNA-friendly explanation of 
Kvanvig’s target cases sourced in the normativity of action in general, so as to stay 
off suspicions of ad-hocness.  
 
                                                
5 It might also be that your belief is unjustified yet blameless—say because you have been 
brainwashed into believing your 3-year-old son on this. This case, however,concerns a control 
condition on blameworthiness that falls outside the scope of this paper. I discuss it more in detail 
elsewhere (Simion and Kelp 2015).  
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